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Introduction 
Je ne sais quoi…
This book is based on the conviction that an honest, detailed 
and contextualised analysis of the English Defence League 
(EDL) and its supporters can shed light on the return of English 
nationalism among the working class in the unpredictable and 
volatile times in which we live. Lately we have witnessed some 
of the most profound shifts in the history of political economy. 
Neoliberalism’s global economic logic has established itself as the 
dominant organising principle in our lives. All known alternative 
modes of socioeconomic organisation have disintegrated and 
virtually disappeared from everyday practice and the popular 
imagination. In such a political hiatus neoliberalism has pressed 
on unhindered, with the deindustrialisation of many areas of 
Europe and North America, and the rapid industrialisation of 
China and other parts of the developing world. In many regions 
of the deindustrialised west we have seen the gap between rich 
and poor grow to historic proportions in a realigned social 
structure that can now be legitimately described as a plutocracy 
(Winlow and Hall, 2013; Dorling, 2014; Therborn, 2014). We 
have also seen global warming, drought, mass migration and the 
depletion of many of the natural resources that are vital to the 
uninterrupted economic growth on which the functioning of 
the capitalist system and the livelihoods of its subjects depend 
(Klare, 2008; Heinberg, 2011; Hiscock, 2012).
Our political culture has grown sterile. It no longer appears 
to be capable of engaging the people in an informed and 
forthright discussion about root-and-branch changes to the way 
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we live together. The vast majority of our politicians display a 
dispiriting lack of will to challenge and overcome the historic 
problems we face. Most have accepted the transformation 
of the old modernist social order, with its unequal yet stable 
and comprehensible structure of entitlements and obligations, 
into a world of hollow freedoms, insecurity and panoramic 
dissatisfaction. The new political consensus has been forged in 
a silent pact between the liberal left and the neoliberal right, a 
dual power bloc that looks down on the corpses of socialism 
and one-nation conservatism (Ranciere, 2010a, 2010b). This 
tacit agreement, built on an unwavering commitment to the free 
market has opened a gap between institutionalised politics and 
the cultural life of the people. The political establishment no 
longer speaks to the experiences, hopes and dreams of ordinary 
people, and dismisses all their fears, no matter how grounded they 
might be, as irrational and counterproductive to the continued 
flourishing of progressive cultural life. It is increasingly devoid of 
the grand visions of fundamental socioeconomic transformation 
that once made politics real and capable of even modestly and 
incrementally delivering on the promises made to men and 
women across the country.
Any honest appraisal of recent times in the west must 
acknowledge that out there in the real world exists a surfeit 
of anxiety. We, as a nation, as a culture, as inhabitants of this 
moribund post-political epoch, appear significantly less sure of 
ourselves than the generation that emerged from the horrors of 
the first half of the 20th century to take on the challenges of 
building a new society among the ruins of the old. We appear to 
have woken up from the modernist dreams of incremental social 
improvement into the pervasive cynicism of neoliberal reality. 
We worry about what lies in store for us, and what lies in store 
for our children and grandchildren. Despite an abundance of 
consumer goods and lives full of a million things we must do, in 
many parts of the west there is an almost palpable sense of lack. 
Huge numbers from across the social spectrum seem to be in 
search of some missing object or force that, were it to suddenly 
reappear, could set matters straight and enable a new positive 
mood to develop. A general sense that things are not quite right 
hangs like a pall in the air. 
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However, we cannot quite manage to identify precisely what 
is missing, and what might be causing this vague but enduring 
discomfort. In making this claim some may accuse us of being 
unnecessarily bleak. However, this bleakness is inextricably tied 
to the subject matter of this book. As we will see, there are many 
ordinary people out there who have an even bleaker outlook. 
They often see for themselves a life of unending struggle, a life 
in which the pleasures of community life have been withdrawn, 
a life of frustration, interrupted all too briefly by occasional 
flurries of consumerist hedonism. They can sense life only as a 
backward step, the loss of things deemed valuable and important. 
The benefits of our allegedly open, marketised society are the 
privileges of others whose elevated position seems unassailable, 
no matter how corrupt they may be. Those trapped in the 
lower echelons can see no forward step in their own lives. They 
are convinced that for them the best times have now been left 
behind. Things are trending downwards. 
As a result of all this, a growing number of these people are now 
very angry. What they lack is not simply absent. Rather, it has 
been purposefully removed, appropriated by competitive others 
keen to secure their own interests. Occasional bursts of happiness 
and charitable fellow-feeling do little to dispel an obdurate sense 
of coming crisis, of things wearing away, of rootlessness and loss. 
Despite the proliferation of affordable consumer goods, advances 
in technology, the onward march of scientific discovery, improved 
healthcare, the spread of democracy and great strides made in 
the tolerance and celebration of difference in culture, sexuality, 
ethnicity, religion and lifestyle, a shared anxiety about the future 
and what it may have in store for us cannot be appeased. This 
malaise is not simply the outcome of marginalisation. It is not 
simply something that affects those at the very bottom. Even 
those who appear to us as the great winners of our time seem 
unable to understand their lives in wholly positive terms. We 
are all living through a time of great wealth and relative cultural 
freedom, but despite this, many carry this sense of foreboding. 
Underneath all the surface freedoms lies a deeper sense of fatalism 
and lassitude, a sense that something better could exist but does 
not, and in all likelihood, never will.
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While we all tend to acknowledge that there is likely to be 
some unknown negativity lurking out there in the shadows, 
for many this awareness is too disturbing to face head on. All 
awareness of a coming crisis is disavowed and blocked from 
consciousness. They know, but they do not want to know, so 
they continue onward as if they are not in possession of this 
knowledge. It is repressed and seeks its return in other forms 
disconnected from the underlying set of causes and conditions 
that gave birth to the crisis. Why think too much and too deeply? 
What good does it do? No one else appears to be particularly 
concerned, and what can one individual really achieve these 
days? Accept the world as it is, and try to make the best of things. 
The commercialisation of all popular culture might indeed be 
crass, but it functions well enough to draw our attention away 
from the real world, with all its manifold pathologies. Porn, 
talent shows, reality TV, social networking, gambling. Foreign 
holidays, celebrity gossip, a big Saturday night out on the town. 
Lager, weed, coke, speed, sex, takeaway food. Valium, Xanax, 
Citalopram, Fluoxetine, Prozac. Of course, we can occupy our 
time in what appear more wholesome ways. Shopping, cooking, 
sport, DIY, gardening, hobbies. We try to keep busy in ways 
that suit our personal interests. We fill our days with activities to 
cover up our deeper inaction, our inability to truly strike out and 
address those things that must be addressed if genuine progress is 
to be made. Not that we don’t want progress. We occasionally 
give a few thoughts to vicarious action. We wait for someone 
or some authoritative body to take measures on our behalf, but 
our cynicism acts against whatever faith we might still have in 
transformative politics and the elites who currently dominate 
our world. We don’t really expect too much. That’s because 
everything is flawed. Everything is in some way sullied. We have 
nothing left to believe in, except our cynical non-belief. Dark 
thoughts continue to lurk at the edge of consciousness. They 
press forward in the downtime and demand recognition. They 
cannot be held at bay forever.
This sense of lack, this sense that something is missing, that 
something valuable and important has been lost, discarded or 
stolen from us – and is therefore no longer accessible to the 
very communities and individuals most in need of it – exists 
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as a general background to our study. Occasionally this sense 
of lack migrates to the foreground to be discussed directly by 
EDL supporters. However, for the most part, it stays in the 
background, framing foreground events and casting them in 
its shadow. 
It didn’t have to be this way…
We hope to carry you, the reader, into the lifeworld of the EDL, 
and the cultural context that gave birth to it. First, we must warn 
you that this world is bleak. It does not inspire optimism, that 
comforting but often politically destructive quality that some 
readers demand the writer should provide as a matter of duty. 
Rather, our goal is to enable you, however briefly, to see the 
world as EDL supporters see it. We also hope to identify the 
fundamental forces that have encouraged these men and women 
to adopt such a crude, forthright and hostile worldview. You 
may find some of this story disturbing, or at least disconcerting. 
Some will no doubt not even pick up this book, convinced that 
we know as much as we need to know about these retrograde 
fascists. Some will claim that writing about them gives them 
the attention, publicity and credibility that they don’t deserve. 
But those who simply oppose what they do not understand are 
running away from the political reality of our times. If social 
scientists are to assist in the task in making sense of that reality, 
we can’t simply restrict ourselves to the nice topics. We can’t 
simply praise the nice people and condemn the bad. We have to 
go deeper. We have to expose ourselves to challenging topics, and 
we have to be honest about what we find. So this book presents 
material that some will find unpalatable. We will also develop an 
analysis that could make many on the political and academic left 
feel uncomfortable, and perhaps mildly aggrieved. No matter. 
We will report the world as we found it, and we will explain 
that world in a manner that seems to us useful and appropriate.
Looking back on our two decades of grounded social research 
with the scattered remnants of England’s old white working class, 
only one thought is uppermost in our minds: it didn’t have to 
be this way. Things could have been so much better, for all of 
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us, and that includes those who have drifted into the dark space 
occupied by the EDL.
All that said, our analysis should not cast us all into a pit 
of despair. Nor will it supply unwanted credibility to the 
dangerous politics of the far right. While our story is often sad, 
frustrating and worrisome, we remain convinced that only by 
acknowledging and coming to terms with the worst of our 
times will a new political movement arise capable of setting 
matters straight. The reality of the social forces that constitute 
the EDL are analogous to the physical forces that cause global 
warming – both stem from activities and events that have 
already taken place. We have no choice but to deal with the 
consequences. Nationalism is on the rise across the continent. 
A large and growing number of working-class men and women 
feel aggrieved. They feel ignored by mainstream politics. This 
is a reality, and it makes no sense to deny it. The first step is to 
reach down to understand what was behind these activities and 
events in the first place. 
What is the English Defence League?
Make no mistake, the EDL represents a misguided attempt 
to respond politically to the enduring sense of diminishment 
and lack we have described above. It attempts to restore what 
has been lost and defend what remains. It hopes to rebuild 
foundations, and clear away the miasma of fakery and doubt that 
hangs over our culture. Analysts are right to suggest that far right 
movements furnish their members with a sense of purpose and 
possibility (Busher, 2015), but why should people need this in 
what we are constantly told is a healthy, functioning democracy? 
After years of cynicism and active disinterest in neoliberalism’s 
democratic apparatus, the rise of the EDL may be the beginning 
of a crypto-proletarian return to a mode of politics that liberals 
fear more than anything else. Gradually, dissatisfaction with what 
exists is slowly pushing individuals back on to the political field. 
However, ideology has changed, and the established ideological 
platforms of modern political movements no longer exist in 
the way they once did. Inevitably, in such a hiatus, there is, as 
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Tilly (2008) suggests, an air of improvisation to contemporary 
working-class politics.
The gradual liberalisation of the political left, and its general 
capitulation to the accountant’s logic that organises the global 
market, have separated it from the lifeworlds of the working 
class. No reassuring account of a safe and secure future emanates 
from the left to re-engage those who suffer in permanent 
insecurity. In many places, the left has become tainted by the 
stain of connivance and graft. Its main political parties have, 
in fact, enacted policies that have destabilised working-class 
neighbourhoods and destroyed traditional labour markets. 
The time-honoured connection between the left and the 
working class has been loosened significantly, if not severed 
altogether. The working class no longer has the progressive 
symbols of the traditional left to rally behind. Instead, insecure 
and politically homeless people grope around for something 
that might explain their parlous circumstances and the general 
sense of lack that pervades their lifeworlds. In this absence of 
political representation, explanation and strategic guidance, the 
EDL’s supporters have misidentified their enemy. Instead they 
can identify only a substitute enemy, a stand-in, a scapegoat 
towards which they can direct their anger and frustration. Thus 
the regressive discourse of nationalism, separatism and ethnic 
demonisation returns (see Chapter Six).
The EDL’s rapid rise to prominence offers us a particularly 
useful high-resolution lens through which we can see in detail 
the gradual degeneration of English society, culture and politics. 
The EDL is, of course, a fringe political group cut adrift from 
mainstream politics and overtly antagonistic to many of the 
central concerns of contemporary liberal multiculturalism. The 
group has no system of formal membership. Rather, it attracts 
supporters who sympathise with the EDL’s core principles and 
goals, the majority of whom drift in and out of its activities. 
However, despite its fragile and sporadic existence, it maintains 
core principles founded on a dissatisfaction with immigration 
policies and a desire to mobilise against the spread of what it sees 
as the hostile alien culture of radical Islamism. It hopes to defend 
the interests of the native population from the perceived threats 
posed by immigrants, multiculturalism and what it imagines to 
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be the growing power and paramilitary forms of the Muslim 
faith in England. 
EDL supporters are also angry about the power of metropolitan 
liberalism and its co-option of the parliamentary system. They are 
angry because this elite has, in recent years, seen fit to open the 
borders of Britain to wave after wave of immigration. They are 
angry because too little has been done to defend the economic 
and cultural entitlements of the white working class, and they 
are angry about the ‘political correctness’ they see as a means 
of systematically avoiding crucial debates about immigration, 
ethnic diversity and religious antagonism. They are angry at 
the perceived capitulation of Westminster to radical Islam at 
home and abroad, they are angry that our armed forces are 
not adequately supported and championed, and they are angry 
at what they perceive to be the gradual dilution of traditional 
English culture and society.
The street protest is The EDL’s principal political activity. They 
have only the vaguest plans to impact upon the government’s 
policy agenda, and, despite the passionate intensity of their 
protests, the organisation appears almost totally devoid of 
revolutionary fervour or a desire for significant structural change. 
We were unable to detect among EDL supporters any great 
aspiration to formalise the group, or to transform it into an 
actual political party. It has no clear hierarchy, and, regionally, 
those who are identified as ‘leaders’ tend simply to be those who 
have been most active in organising protests and meetings. EDL 
supporters do, however, have an active presence on the internet, 
especially on social networking sites. Their utopianism, where it 
exists at all, is vaguely ‘conservative’ in the rather muddled sense 
that could sometimes be found in the old working-class culture, 
and tends to concern itself with the inviolability of their own 
traditional culture, ‘values’ and community life. 
While the EDL might on the surface display some of the 
hallmarks of traditional fascism or Nazism, it also displays a 
number of significant characteristics that set it apart from these 
older political forms. For example, many EDL supporters 
actually speak in support of the Jewish faith and the rights of 
Israel to defend itself against the perceived aggression of Palestine 
and neighbouring Islamic states. While much of the academic 
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literature tells us that the cultural and religious conflicts of today 
tend to be rooted in regressive forms of bigotry and hatred, 
such logic fails to represent the reality and historical causes of 
such conflict. Reducing the complexities of systematised and 
institutionalised conflict to basic emotional states is too simplistic. 
However, if we must persevere with such logic, we should note 
that hatred is, in fact, not the dominant emotion displayed by 
EDL supporters. While some did express what appeared to be 
a genuine hatred of radical Islamism, inarticulate anger was the 
basic emotion that appeared to typify the EDL’s cultural and 
political life. Those we spoke to were complex individuals fully 
capable of feeling and expressing a broad range of emotions 
and sentiments. However, when we attempted to talk to our 
respondents in everyday social settings about what we might 
broadly conceive as political issues, anger that was entirely 
disconnected from the causes of their parlous socioeconomic 
position came quickly to the fore. 
This palpable sense of underlying and very potent yet 
inarticulate anger begs a series of questions that structure the 
argument we develop in this book. The most important are 
these: What is the EDL angry about? Where does this anger 
come from, and how do EDL supporters justify and explain it? 
What is it about Islam, Islamic culture and the realities of Muslim 
community life that makes everything Islamic the primary object 
of anger? And why do EDL supporters express their anger in 
the way they do? Why do they focus on street protests, and why 
do they not, as a group, engage with the established structures 
of parliamentary democracy?
Once was England 
From the outset it is important to note that the EDL draws the 
overwhelming majority of its support from Britain’s old white 
working class. The EDL is, unequivocally, a working-class 
political movement. In making this claim we are not attempting 
to pathologise the white working class. Rather, we are simply 
stating a fact that has been made clear to us during our years of 
fieldwork. We do not deny that the EDL has a few middle-class 
supporters. However, the EDL’s core support is unmistakably 
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working class. All of those we spoke to displayed the traditional 
characteristics of white working-class identity and culture. 
Our fieldwork was generally conducted in the spaces of 
contemporary white working-class cultural life. We spent a lot 
of time in pubs, from the ubiquitous corporate bars of the city 
centre to neighbourhood boozers on sprawling council estates. 
We also spent time in the homes of our respondents, and often 
walked with them around their neighbourhoods. We sat around 
drinking mugs of tea in greasy spoon cafes, we accompanied our 
respondents to the bookies, and stood chatting with them on 
street corners and outside pubs and shops. On Saturdays we often 
headed off to the football. Certainly, we did not encounter any 
EDL supporters who identified themselves as middle or upper 
class. More importantly, many of our contacts were animated 
by issues connected to the contemporary politics of class. Time 
and time again we were told that the EDL’s cause was to protect 
the cultural and economic interests of England’s forgotten white 
working class. These men and women are often depicted as 
unseemly and hostile provocateurs, disrupting an otherwise 
civilised and hospitable multiethnic urban culture, but to them, 
their actions were essentially defensive in nature. When they 
imagined themselves to be moving forward politically, they 
believed that they were moving forward to reclaim something 
that had been taken away from them. 
Our respondents articulated a general ‘politics of us’, and in 
some cases, although certainly not all, this ‘politics of us’ appeared 
quite cogent, and reasonably well informed about recent changes 
to working-class cultural and economic life. Many were quite 
clearly bonded to their communities, and believed themselves 
to be standing up to defend these communities from powerful 
external threats. They spoke at length about the rise of radical 
Islam and the ubiquitous terrorist threat. They spoke about 
the involvement of Muslim men in the sexual exploitation of 
vulnerable young white girls. They spoke about Sharia law and 
their unwillingness to yield a single additional yard on the field of 
cultural politics. And when they spoke about these things, they 
spoke in a forthright manner that reflected their desire to push 
past the cloying cultural sensitivities that have grown around the 
popular discussion of immigration, ethnic conflict and religious 
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diversity. We will excavate the foundations of these motivations 
and explanations as the book develops.
The sentiments and discourse behind the EDL are connected 
to the concrete localised consequences of the changing economic 
and cultural circumstances of the white working class. In their 
rush to condemn the EDL’s politics, many liberal commentators 
omit this crucial and perfectly obvious fact. Many of our 
respondents talked in detail about the accumulating problems 
they faced as they tried to reproduce a reasonably safe and 
secure life for themselves and for their families. They talked 
about declining job prospects, job insecurity, low pay and the 
difficulties of meeting what they considered to be their basic 
economic obligations. They believed that the politicians of 
Westminster and the elites of the big city considered the white 
working class superfluous in a rapidly changing global economy. 
They believed that, as a class, they had been, and continue to be, 
downwardly mobile in economic terms, and vilified, excluded 
and silenced in cultural terms. They were being overtaken by 
new economic migrants who were playing the system, and 
mainstream politicians were complicit in the gradual degradation 
of the neighbourhoods and life chances of the working class. 
These things bothered our respondents greatly, and other more 
specific complaints, frustrations and dissatisfactions merged with 
these issues to supply energy to the EDL’s angry critique of 
politics. Class identity and class interests were, from the outset, 
of great importance in the EDL’s account of itself, and it was 
immediately clear to us that any attempt to explain the politics 
of the EDL must position class centrally in its analysis. 
We have no desire to produce yet another descriptive account 
of the changing class system and the life chances of the white 
working class, and nor will we reduce the rise of the EDL to 
the economic instability caused by fundamental changes made 
to global political economy in the neoliberal era. These issues 
are important as primary conditions in which anger becomes a 
probability for those who suffer the worst consequences of this 
epochal shift, but they cannot, by themselves, explain why the 
EDL developed when it did and in the manner it did. By itself, 
an analysis of economic change and the systemic decline of 
Britain’s productivist full employment economy will shed little 
